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Abstract I examine a model of long-term contracting in which the buyer is privately
informed about the discrete probability distribution for his future value for a divisible
product, and fully characterize the optimal long term contract that will be offered by a
monopolistic seller in a simple case where two types of buyers can have two types of
utility in any period. In such a case, the buyermore likely to have a high utility typewill
receive the first-best allocations indifferent of his value report, while the lower typewill
receive the first best only if he makes a high utility report. The paper also supplements
the current literature on infinite dynamic games with continuous buyer types, which
relies on the use of a distribution of types with full support and an envelope theorem.
With discrete types, the number of compatibility constraints considered can be greatly
reduced by sandwiching the border of the space of solutions allowed by constraints:
formulate themaximization problem in a wider space with fewer constraints and prove
that the solution obeys a simpler set of stronger constraints that places it in the allowed
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1 Introduction and related literature
The relationships between buyers and sellers are often dynamic in nature, and the
relevant private information will rarely stay hidden when there is repeated interac-
tion. This has important implications for the pricing of products or the transfer of
goods between a principal and an agent, since the inefficiency induced by asymmetric
information may be reduced by considering the long term behavior of the agent.
There are many ways to model repeated interactions between a principal and an
agent, say a seller and a buyer, and by the revelation principle the optimal mechanism
will involve the buyer reporting his private information, as long as adequate incentive
compatibility and rationality conditions are satisfied. Because of truthful reporting, if
the private information known when the contract is signed is the only thing that has a
bearing on future private information the problem can be seen intuitively in a greatly
simplified way. The dynamic contract resembles a string of static ones, contingent on
the time period, agent type and period specific reports.
An early contribution in the literature on dynamic mechanisms with adverse selec-
tion is the work of Baron and Besanko (1984), who describe a monopoly able to
commit, dealing with an agent of variable type, in two periods. Dynamic settings
with constant types are considered in Dewatripont (1989), Hart and Tirole (1988),
and Laffont and Tirole (1988), Laffont and Tirole (1990). Cremer and McLean (1988)
justifies the usual assumption of independent information across agent types to pre-
vent full rent extraction. Laffont and Tirole (1990) introduce a standard framework,
analyze the two-period renegotiation proof contract, and Laffont and Tirole (1996)
introduce variable agent types and commitment in the context of regulation. More
dynamic models in which types are stochastically determined are studied by Rusti-
chini and Wolinsky (1995), and Courty and Li (2000). In more recent contributions,
Battaglini (2005) studies variable stochastic types in infinite time with commitment,
and Battaglini (2007) analyzes limited commitment with stochastic types. Eso˝ and
Szentes (2007) consider many agents in two time periods, when the principal can
also release private information. Bergemann and Välimäki (2010) and Athey and
Segal (2013) introduce dynamic generalizations of the classic Vickery-Clarke-Groves
incentive compatible and efficient mechanism, Boleslavsky and Said (2013) study an
infinite period dynamic interaction with persistent shocks and continuous types, while
Pavan et al. (2014) work on the general mechanism design problem with continuous
types.
From an application perspective, it is interesting to consider that there is a link
between the private information at different times, and this link can be stochastic—
given by a probabilistic evolution; statistic—given by an underlining condition like an
initial probability distribution; or in general a combination. In Battaglini (2005), we
see the simplest formof a stochastic link: the utility type evolves according to aMarkov
process. It is simplest in the sense that the information is linked only between con-
secutive periods, and the preceding periods to the last are irrelevant. By contrast, this
paper considers a statistic link: the utility types are given by a distribution depending
on a buyer type.
This paper presents the interaction between a buyer and a seller, when the buyer
has private information about his periodic utility type, and his long run buyer type. The
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buyer type will be informative of the utility type in terms of probabilities, and all buyer
types will draw from the same discrete set of utility types. The buyer type is private
information and will influence the type of contract that is optimally offered only to
him. A general model for the interaction between a seller and a buyer with one of a
discrete set of types is developed. General results allowing for the simplification of the
problem are obtained, based on the idea of generating a restricted set of constraints and
finding a candidate mechanism in the larger parameter space restricted by that subset,
and then verifying that a sufficiently strong set of constraints also hold. The results are
applied to derive expressions for optimal allocations in a setting in which each period
the buyer can have one of two possible utility types, a low type and a high type, which
can change over time. The utility types are selected according to a distribution which
can also change, with the condition that the high buyer type is more likely to have the
higher utility type each period. The analysis shows that there is separation between
buyer types: for the two types, two contracts are offered, and for each of these contracts,
reporting different utility types in a period leads to different allocations in that period.
In a typical way, allocations for unprofitable low buyer types have to be reduced, to
reduce the information rent paid to the profitable high types. Therefore, allocations
are optimal following high utility reports of any buyer types, and also optimal for low
utility reports of the high buyer types, but are distorted for low buyer types reporting
low utility types. Prices in the optimal menu can be chosen to compensate buyers for
an optimal level of information rent. As expected, the level of distortion is increasing
in the relative weight of high types, and increasing in the difference of the effects of
private information. If the buyer type is reported in a truthful mechanism in the first
period, any dynamic changes of allocations are a reflection of time changes of the
possible type values, which are common knowledge. The contribution of this worked
application is to extend the analysis of the dynamic interaction between a principal and
an agent of two possible types, who has private information about his future demand
and about the likelihood of that demand being high or low, also allowing the demand
types and the likelihood to vary in a general way over time.
It is important to look at such dynamic contractual relationships, since they are
of major importance in an economy. As information technology advances, tracking
customers becomes easier and can lead to better tailored products and offers (Miravete
2003). Handling such long term data can improve the customer screening potential of
companies which have the resources. Examples are businesses that sell memberships
to repeat clients. They have the ability to enforce long term contracts, and the service
usage can be carefully monitored. Moreover, the service to users can be charged at
different rates based on quantity brackets, and the seller can package utility increasing
features into the contract. The contracts themselves come with initial or overtime
financial commitments. The consumer will arguably have knowledge of his potential
usage pattern, defining a possible buyer type, and his monthly consumption choice
would be equivalent to reporting a period specific type—by the taxation principle.
One can consider also monopolistic suppliers selling to a small business, or franchise
owners dealing with individual franchises. The agent companies and franchises hold
specific private information about the profitability of the business, as well as about
the day to day sales potential, which would determine short term profits. Long term
strategy must incorporate the information from repeated interaction.
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The approach of this paper is novel also because of themethodof analysis employed.
As is standard in the literature, incentive compatibility constraints necessary for a
direct truthful mechanism have to be introduced in the maximization problem. The
goal is to restrict the relevant set of incentive compatibility constraints.1 To simplify
the problem consider, in a first stage, consider only the compatibility constraints that
have to be satisfied after the contract is signed, and after the buyer reports truthfully
the private information he has ex ante. These constrains ignore the buyers that have
misreported their initial private information. With only this subset of constraints, say
W , the optimal menu space considered is wider than allowed, so any menu found
satisfying W that is also incentive compatible ex ante will be fully optimal. With
the problem thus divided, the next step involves finding conditions that restrict the
large space of viable parameters—these conditions are equivalent to W holding. Then
maximization conditions are applied to this restricted set of parameters, so that the
solution is fully incentive compatible.Because distortions in allocations arise as a result
of ex ante private information, the more analytically involved problem is figuring out
correct allocations that satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints between ex ante
types. The benefit of this method is that the analytically difficult part can be separated,
and expressions are solved in a problem with far fewer parameters.
This type of contracting problem is important since agent private information that
comes in sequentially is realistic in many settings. As a qualitative justification for this
assertion, consider the problem faced by a gym, trying to sell gym memberships. For
simplicity, assume there are only two kinds of buyers: a heavy gym user type, and a
light user type. The light user type is more likely to only want access to basic machines
and facilities, while the heavy user typewill more often require specific facilities (pool,
squash court, fitness classes), in addition to the basics. In this example, the heavy and
light users are our high and low types, and the momentary need for facilities in the
gym is the period by period utility type. Both the heavy and the light users know what
they will likely want, but do not yet know when that would happen. The difference
is understood to be in the frequency of this demand. The results suggests a low type
should be offered a basicmembership package, with pay-per-use access to the facilities
not included, while a high type should be offered an extensive package, which comes
with a discount on more facilities, and which is worthwhile only for a heavy user. The
discount would correspond to the information rent paid to the high type, since he has
the option of buying the basic package.
Courty and Li (2000) study a similar problem about the allocation of an indivisible
good, where private information is linked across only two time periods. Both a discrete
two-type case and a continuum of types are considered. In the first period the agent
finds out his type, which partially restricts the buyer’s possible valuations for the ticket
in the future. The informativeness of the buyer’s private information can differ both in
the sense of first order stochastic dominance—when the high type knows he values a
ticket more than the low type, or in the sense of a mean-preserving spread—when the
high type is more uncertain about the value of the ticket. The first period information
can be used by the principal to propose an interim contract to increase his returns,
1 In settings with continuous types, additional assumptions on the distribution related to the inverse hazard
rate or first order stochastic dominance have precisely this function.
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compared to signing the contract ex post when the agent has all the private information.
Considering contracts with partial refunds, the authors find that the informativeness
of the signal the buyer gets is what determines the optimal mechanisms, and not
the uncertainty that affects all the buyer types. The virtual value determined in the
continuous type case is suggestive of the allocations determined in this paper. In both
cases, the distortion of the low type is proportional to the informativeness of the initial
agent type and the relative difference in the utility types. The private information that
the buyer has before signing the contract is what leads to information rents and to
distortions of future allocations from the first-best. Therefore, one would expect that
the present set-up induces distortions at arbitrary periods similarly, to account for the
same private information. However, that cannot be directly deduced, since the utility
type reports in future periods can provide information on the initial buyer type, so
the dynamic game is not separable into independent games at different periods. The
present paper can be seen as extending some of their results to an arbitrary, possibly
infinite, number of periods.
Battaglini (2005) considers an alternative approach, with a dynamic interaction
between a buyer and a seller in infinite time, much like in this paper, where agent
utility can change period by period based on a discrete utility type determinant, and
this type is linked across time by a Markov (memoryless) process. It is assumed that
types are positively correlated across time, that is, a high type is more likely than a
low type to become a high type again. The incipient type evolution in the first two
periods is the same as in the present paper, whichwill consider that types are correlated
across time based on a common distribution, so it is no surprise that the allocations
are also the same. After the second period, the dynamics diverge: in Battaglini (2005)
the distortion for the low report type remains only after a history of low-type reports,
and is probabilistically reduced progressively until it vanishes at infinity; in this paper
the distorted allocation for a low type report is maintained indifferent of the history
of low-type reports, and does not converge to the first best. Rustichini and Wolinsky
(1995) work with another simpler model with Markov types in which the strategic
agent behavior is limited, and the focus is on the principal’s learning of the demand
environment.
Boleslavsky and Said (2013) examine a model with a dynamic interaction between
a buyer and a seller, which shares many of the features of the model herein. The
significant differences are that (i) they use a continuous buyer distribution with pos-
itive support—i.e., there are no gaps in buyer types, and that (ii) the shocks to the
period by period utility type of the buyer have a very specific structure, with persistent
effect—the buyer’s value is proportional to the product of the history of shocks. The
no-gap-in-buyer-type assumption is necessary, given the analysis method, much like
in Pavan et al. (2014), because of the use of the envelope theorem to restrict incentive
compatibility constraints. The assumption of the buyer value as a product of shocks is
howevermore consequential. It makes any shock to the valuation of the buyer infinitely
persistent, and itsmultiplicative form leads to a “path-independence” property for allo-
cations, which is used in reducing the number of compatibility constraints considered,
thus simplifying the analysis. The optimal allocations derived start with “honeymoon
phases” of advantageous prices of different lengths, and demanding different entry
costs, which serve to screen the buyer types.
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In a very important recent paper, Pavan et al. (2014) attempt to characterize gen-
eral dynamic mechanism design problems in finite and infinite time. They consider
a general stochastic process for information, with possibly non-time-separable agent
payoffs. To obtain more explicit results, they require continuity in the probability mea-
sure that determines types, and in general, continuity in the total variation metric. The
results do not translate to discrete type settings, where the differential methods cannot
apply, however, they are quite general, and the intuition described is informative. In
particular, the authors note that the change in informativeness of the period-by-period
report of the buyer determines the change in time of the allocation distortion. In the
present paper, the optimal truthful mechanism requires reporting the buyer type in the
first period, which implies that the allocation distortions in subsequent periods should
be the same, since future reports are equally informative for the seller.
2 A general discrete model for the buyer’s problem
Consider a setting with a monopolistic principal, or seller, and an agent, or buyer.
The seller and the buyer are interacting over possibly infinitely many periods t ∈
{0, 1, . . . , n}. The buyer can be of one of a finite set of types, indexed by α, and
the ex-ante distribution of α types is common knowledge. Furthermore, let θ be the
period-by-period utility type of the buyer, which can take any value from the finite
set {θ1, . . . , θl}, and define the probability mass function of buyer type α over utility
types θ to be λα(·), which has full support.
Let the buyer’s utility function at time t beUt (θ t , qt (·), pt (·)), possibly time depen-
dent, discounted if needed.2 For any α and t, θ t can take any of the finite set of values
{θ1, . . . , θl}, and the allocation qt (h0, h1, . . . , ht ) and price pt (h0, h1, . . . , ht ) are a
function of the history of messages h0, h1, . . . , ht previously sent by the buyer. At
time 0, the buyer is assumed to report his buyer type α, receive no allocation and
make no payment. Because the seller will be able to commit, he can delay payment so
U0 ≡ 0 is w.l.o.g., with the outside option of the buyer normalized to 0. The reports
ht are determined by a function of the buyer’s true type, demand type history, and a
history of past reports, ht ≡ σt (α, θ1, θ2, . . . , θ t , h˜0, . . . , h˜t−1), where σ ≡ {σt (·)} is
the player’s strategy. With h0 ≡ σ0(α), h1 = σ1(α, θ1, σ0(α)), . . . , ht is determined
recursively by σ on the path of play. To simplify notation,  ji and H
j
i will represent
the ordered tuples (θ i , θ i+1, . . . , θ j ) and (hi , hi+1, . . . , h j ) or, in a slight abuse of
notation, the sets of such tuples.
The buyer utility type θ is private information in every round, and he is also privately
informed about his type α before the contract is signed. There is a common prior
over the distribution of the buyer types α. The seller has the power to commit to a
contract and is risk neutral. Both buyer and seller are expected utility maximizers, and
not liquidity constrained. Based on the revelation principle, the following derivations
restrict attention to direct truthful mechanisms. The game starts in period 0, with the
2 With infinite periods, a sufficient condition is that the overall payoff is the discounted sum of a per-period
utility function that is uniformly bounded. That is, ∃δ ∈ [0, 1), ∃B s.t. maxθ t ,qt ,pt |δ−tUt (θ t , qt , pt )| <
B, which implies
∑
t Ut (·) < ∞ (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991, p. 110).
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buyer reporting his α value—in other words, his buyer type, after which he may have
to make a payment, although we may assume w.l.o.g. that the payment is deferred to
the subsequent rounds. In subsequent rounds, the buyer reports his θ utility type in
each round, receives an allocation q and makes a new payment. In the following, the
focus is on a game with infinite periods, but sometimes I may also consider a finite
period game for description or as a stepping stone. The results will hold for the finite
as well as infinite settings. In the finite case I will ignore discounting.
2.1 Reducing the number of ICC conditions
It is interesting to consider both the finite and the infinite time periods versions. For
the infinite setting, a recursive approach could be attempted, but simple considerations
show that the number of relevant state variables grows linearly in time, and it is not
immediate in what way one can summarize the relevant history. Therefore, looking
at the optimal direct mechanism for the finite game is easier, and could possibly be
extended with a continuity argument to the infinite setting. For that, one typically con-
siders rationality and incentive compatibility constraints, which are then incorporated
in a global maximization problem. However, as the number of time periods grows, the
number of incentive compatibility conditions will also grow polynomially.
It is important then to reduce this number as much as possible before proceeding
to any analysis. The first step is proving that the relevant incentive compatibility
conditions can be restricted. Any direct truthful mechanism that implements a menu
will have to satisfy individual rationality constraints (IRCs) for each α, since the buyer
has ex-ante information about his type before he signs a contract.With the initial period
utility and the outside option at 0,














where t1 = (θ1, . . . , θ t ) is one possible sub-history of utility types for period 1 to
period t , and λα(θ i ) is the probability of getting the value θ i that is given by the
distribution indicated by α. In addition, the buyer may consider participating in each
subsequent round, generating other IRCs at each period k ≥ 1:



















where Hk−10 = (h0, h1, . . . , hk−1) is a history of past reports and tk |θk =
(θk, . . . , θ t ) any following sub-history of true reports, conditional on the first report
being θk . Because the seller has the flexibility to set the payment schedule, these
additional IRCs will not constrain the result, implying that the buyer is not required
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to commit for all time periods.3 The incentive compatibility constraints (ICCs) for a






























where Hn0 = (h0, h1, . . . , hn) is given by σ . In particular, these expressions include
the compatibility conditions for deviations at specific sub-histories only.
Proposition 2.1 The set of incentive compatibility conditions (1) is satisfied if a
stronger set of compatibility conditions (S) hold, whereby in each period and after any
history the buyer considers only one-time deviations from truth, followed by truthful
reporting in the future. That is, the ICCs are implied by the following set of inequalities,














































where Hn0 is given by σ .
Proof For now let n < ∞. The proof is by induction. First consider a finite setting
with n periods. Let σ be any strategy, and consider a deviation from this strategy to
truth telling, only in the last period n, on only one of the possible histories. Assume








n)) ≥ Un(θn, qn(Hn0 ), pn(Hn0 )). (2)
It is just a special case of (1), and of (S) when k = n. Now, for a generic σ , it implies
that ∀ α:
3 See Proposition 3.1 for an example.
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so it makes sense to always report truthfully in the last period. This is the first step
in the induction process. In general, consider that the following holds for an arbitrary













































Assume that S hold. S say that, given future truthful reporting, the buyer finds the
total discounted utility from reporting his true type today is larger than for any other
report. Notice that this has to hold for all α, and for any history prior to period k. Using
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This result is the induction step, which takes us to k = 1. The last step is applying the
0-period ICC, which is also in S. Therefore, we have used expressions S to obtain the
ICCs.















which is bounded and must go to 0 as k → ∞, implicit if the infinite sums in the
ICC conditions are well defined.4 For an infinite direct mechanism that implements a
menu, say that the infinite set of constraints S will hold. Let σ represent an optimal
but not necessarily truthful strategy, mapping any buyer type and sequence of utility
types to optimal reports, and let τ be the truthful strategy. The proof idea is to devise
an approximate strategy that is a “truncated” version of σ , in which the buyer reports
4 For example, it is sufficient to expressUt as a weakly concave utility function multiplied with geometric
discounting, and assume an upper bound on the money transfers in any period.
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accordingwith the strategyσ up to period k, and then he reports truthfully, so according
to τ . Let σk be that strategy. Then it must be that the payoff from the new strategy is an
increasingly good approximation as k increases, since only the partial sum from k on is
changed, i.e., Vσk → Vσ as k → ∞.5 Fix k, and apply the compatibility conditions in
S from period k backwards to prove, again by induction, that the completely truthful
strategy is weakly better than the “truncated” σ , which approximates in payoff the
original, i.e., ∀k ≥ 0: Vτ ≥ Vσk . But by assumption Vτ ≤ Vσ , so letting k go to
infinity gives us by dominated convergence that Vτ = Vσ . We obtain that truthful
reporting is weakly optimal in the context of a menu satisfying S, which implies that
that S are more restrictive than the ICCs, so the regular ICCs have to hold when S
hold. 
unionsq
Intuitively, the alternative conditions of Proposition 2.1 allow us to improve, step
by step, any non-truthful strategy by considering deviations towards truthful reporting.
Starting with an arbitrary strategy σ the last period, it must be that, if it is preferable
for the buyer to not lie regardless of the past history, he will improve on σ by reporting
truthfully. This must hold after any history, so we immediately have that in the last
period S implies truthful reporting. This allows us to move to the previous period,
where we again observe, history by history, that truthful reporting is preferred, and so
on by backward induction. This is possible since there are compatibility conditions
for any α type at each node; i.e., it is optimal for the buyer not to lie, assuming
truthful reporting in the future, even if he isn’t supposed to get this menu because he
misrepresented his α. It is thus possible to improve onto any σ by deviating towards
the truthful strategy. Once there, it follows that S restrict the possible mechanisms
at least as much as the ICCs, since the truthful strategy is optimal only if the ICCs
hold.
The result holds for n = ∞ also, and the proof is by contradiction. Starting again
with a possibly non-truthful strategy σ , we can approximate it by assuming that after
period k the buyer decides to report truthfully. Only after period k will his utility be
changed by the new strategy, and the change is small if k is large. This must be true as
long as his lifetime utility expressed as an infinite sum over periods is well defined;
then the partial sum over time must converge. With the new strategy it is possible to
use conditions in S as before, to prove by backward induction that true reporting is
superior to the approximated σ . Then, in the limit k → ∞, we must have that the true
strategy is as good as σ . But this statement is precisely the requirement that truthful
strategies satisfy the ICCs, which is what we need to prove.
Proposition 2.2 The set of ICCs in (1) imply a weaker set of compatibility conditions
(W) in which the buyer, who has reported his true type α if he is in periods after the 0th,
considers only one-time deviations from truth, followed by truthful reporting in the
future. That is, the ICCs imply the following inequalities, for6 k ∈ 0, n , ∀ σ, α,k1:
5 Vσ is a shorthand for the value of expression (3) evaluated for strategy σ .
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0,t1), pt (h
0,t1)).
Proof The proof is obvious, and the idea is to observe that the compatibility conditions
expressed in W can be seen as just a subset of the ICCs. For the last inequality above,
it is obvious. In general, consider the ICC for two strategies, the truthful strategy and




k) = hk and, subsequently, again truthful reporting after any
continuation history. One can simplify the ICC by eliminating the payoffs for the
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Fig. 1 The restricted domains





Simplify the common factor to get the generic compatibility condition of W. In this
construction, we haven’t assumed n < ∞, so the result holds for the infinite setting.

unionsq
The proof rests on the observation that, if reporting truthfully is always better
than not, then it is also better than lying only once, and that the continuation utilities
for a person who considers lying once are the same as for a person who may have
misrepresented his past utility types—θ , as long as he is the same buyer type α. This is
true because future payoffs depend only on reports and the buyer type, which are both
assumed the same. Sohaving compatibility conditions in each period checkingwhether
a buyer prefers lying for that period to true reporting is equivalent to considering some
of the ICCs.
We can therefore say W ⊂ ICCs, and W ⊂ S is by definition. Proposition 2.1
says that if a menu satisfies S, then it also satisfies the ICCs, so we can think of the
set of possible menus under S as more restrictive than those that satisfy the ICCs. In
general, a menu implemented by a mechanism will be a point in the menu parameter
space. The sets of conditions W,S , ICCs will delimit a subset of this space, where
the menus inside obey the conditions. Let D[·] denote the subset. Then we must have
D[S] ⊂ D[ICCs] ⊂ D[W ] (Fig. 1). Now consider the maximization problem that
determines the optimal mechanism. To find the optimal truthful mechanismwe need to
restrict the domain of menus to D[ICCs]. A containing domain may generate a false
maximum, if it is located outside D[ICCs], while a subdomain can lead to maxima
on its boundaries that could be suboptimal. To solve for the optimal mechanism in the
application that follows, my strategy will be to find the optimal menu in D[W] and
show that it is in D[S].
The private information of the buyer is separated into two parts: the type α, which is
private knowledge ex-ante, and the type θ , which is conditionally distributed according
to α and known after the contract is signed. Intuitively, this methods relies on the fact
that we can always segregate the private information of the buyer in such a way. After
that, W is the set of constraints that insure truthful reporting once α is known, so any
mechanism constrained by W will be optimal as long as the contract has payments at



























Fig. 2 Moves by nature determining types. The vertical dotted line shows when the contract is signed
between the buyer and the seller conditional on α is common knowledge, this is always
possible.
3 An application with two types
In the following application, the buyer is of two possible types, and has two possible
utility types. The buyer’s utility in any one time period is given by
Ut (θ
t , qt , pt ) = θ t qt − (qt )2/2 − pt (qt ),
where qt is the buyer’s consumption in period t, pt is the price he pays for it, henceforth
determined by qt .θ t is the utility or demand type, and can take one of the values
{θ th, θ tl }, which are common knowledge.7 The buyer has ex-ante private information
about the probability of having a utility type θ th instead of θ
t
l in any one period. This
probability is determined by the buyer’s type, and can take the values {αth, 1 − αth}
or {αtl , 1 − αtl }, also common knowledge. Using the notation of the general set-up,
αth ≡ λh(θ th), 1−αth ≡ λh(θ tl ), αtl ≡ λl(θ th), and 1−αtl ≡ λl(θ tl ). The common prior
is that the high and low buyer types appear with odds {ϕ, 1 − ϕ} respectively. This
setting is sketched in Fig. 2. The game starts in period 0, with the buyer reporting
his buyer type—so future α values, and he reports his utility type in each subsequent
round—the θ value, receiving his allocation qt and making a new payment. For all t ,
7 It is common to consider the quadratic portion, q2/2, as a cost to the seller for producing quantity q. If
we define the price net of cost, it does not change the analysis or interpretation.
123
Dynamic contracting under permanent and transitory...
let θ th > θ
t
l ≥ 0, 1 > αth > αtl > 0, 1 > ϕ > 0.8 To relate to literature, observe that
αth > α
t
l implies that the draw from {αth, 1 − αth} first-order stochastically dominates
the draw from {αtl , 1−αtl }. The initial results in Sect. 2.1 were derived without making
assumptions onUt (θ t , qt , pt ) and only requiring that all θ t are from the same discrete
set. In the following, the time index will be dropped for clarity. The arguments are the
same for all periods considered, but the values of θ and α are allowed to change over
time provided that the inequalities and the common knowledge assumptions above
hold.
3.1 Fixing some of the allocations
The next step is to reduce the possible ways in which a menu representing a truthful
mechanism can be constructed. The goal is to obtain specific expressions for alloca-
tions, and to interpret and describe the equilibrium. This section shows through a few
lemmas that the optimal menu must have first best allocations for reports of θh , as well
as for θl after type αh was reported. The following lemmas hold for any n ≤ ∞, and
also if we rephrase them with S instead of W .
Lemma 3.1 Consider any period with allocations. Denote with qh, ql the quantities
and ph, pl the prices in the menu offered to the buyer in that period, contingent upon
the θ -type report, and let uh, ul be the expected continuation utilities for the buyer,
given by the buyer type and truthful reporting in the future. Then, if conditions W
hold, it must be that qh ≥ ql .
Proof Assume theW compatibility conditions in the period hold. By them it isw.l.o.g.
that in the future the player will report truthfully. Then there are only two continuation
values that are needed to describe a player’s incentives, say uh and ul , and:
θhqh − q2h/2 − ph + uh ≥ θhql − q2l /2 − pl + ul
θlql − q2l /2 − pl + ul ≥ θlqh − q2h/2 − ph + uh .
We can rewrite the equations to:
θh(qh − ql) ≥ ph − pl + q2h/2 − q2l /2 + ul − uh
ph − pl + q2h/2 − q2l /2 + ul − uh ≥ θl(qh − ql),
from which one can deduce that (θh − θl)(qh − ql) ≥ 0. Since θh > θl , we must have
that qh ≥ ql . This lemma remains true if we replace W with S, because we would
have similar inequalities for each pair uαl , u
α
h , leading to the same conclusion. 
unionsq
The result can be understood to mean that, if ql > qh and if a buyer with θl prefers
the low allocation and price to the high ones, then the buyer with θh must prefer it
too, because his total utility is increased more by an increase in the allocation, and
8 Strict inequalities are assumed to consider interesting cases. The results hold in the limit.
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future utility is determined only by today’s report, and not by today’s true type. But
this evidently contradicts a compatibility condition.
Lemma 3.2 Consider any period with allocations in the game described. Denote
with qh, ql the quantities and ph, pl the prices in the menu offered to the buyer in that
period, and let uh, ul be the expected continuation utilities. Assuming that W hold, it
must be that qh ≥ θh and ql ≤ θl in the optimal menu.
Proof Prove by contradiction, i.e., assume that qh < θh . Then ∃
 > 0 s.t. qh +
 < θh .
Now consider the following changes in the menu offered: qh → qh + 
, and ph →
ph + (θh − qh)
 − 
2/2. Observe that both qh and ph are strictly increased.
The new expected utility of the buyer, when he truthfully reports θh , is:
θh(qh + 
) − (qh + 
)2/2 − (ph + (θh − qh)
 − 
2/2) + uh
= θhqh − q2h/2 − ph + uh .
When the buyer reports θl , everything stays the same.Nowverify that the new incentive
compatibility conditions will also be satisfied:
θh(qh + 
) − (qh + 
)2/2 − (ph + (θh − qh)
 − 
2/2) + uh ≥ θhql
− q2l /2 − pl + ul
θlql − q2l /2 − pl + ul ≥ θl(qh + 
) − (qh + 
)2/2




θhqh − q2h/2 − ph + uh ≥ θhql − q2l /2 − pl + ul
θlql − q2l /2 − pl + ul ≥ θlqh − q2h/2 − ph − (θh − θl)
 + uh .
Because (θh − θl)
 > 0, the old incentive compatibility conditions imply that these
hold. Any other constraints, either incentive compatibility constraints at other nodes
or individual rationality constraints, will not be changed, because the expected utility
for the buyer does not change. Therefore we have found that there is a way to strictly
improve the seller’s expected return, without changing the expected payoff of the
buyer. So this allocation is not optimal, therefore qh ≥ θh . For the statement ql ≤ θl ,
prove by contradiction by assuming that ql ≥ θl . Then ∃
 > 0 s.t. ql − 
 > θl . Now
change the menu offered: ql → ql − 
, and pl → pl + (ql − θl)
 − 
2/2. Observe
that ql is strictly decreased while pl is strictly increased. The new expected utility for
the buyer that truthfully reports θl does not change:
θl(ql − 
) − (ql − 
)2/2 − (pl + (ql − θl)
 − 
2/2) + ul = θlql − q2l /2 − pl + ul .
Neither does the utility of the buyer that truthfully reports θh . The new incentive
compatibility constraints are:
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θhqh − q2h/2 − ph + uh ≥ θh(ql − 
) − (ql − 
)2/2




) − (ql − 
)2/2 − (pl + (ql − θl)
 − 
2/2)
+ ul ≥ θlqh − q2h/2 − ph + uh
⇔
θhqh − q2h/2 − ph + uh ≥ θhql − q2l /2 − pl − (θh − θl)
 + ul
θlql − q2l /2 − pl + ul ≥ θlqh − q2h/2 − ph + uh .
These new conditions must hold if the old ones did. Also, no other compatibility or
rationality conditions will be changed. So this change improves the seller’s return,
therefore it must be that ql ≥ θl was suboptimal. 
unionsq
This lemma shows that the θh type must always be allocated at least the first best in
an optimal mechanism, because one can always increase a suboptimal allocation, and
then charge a higher price to compensate his utility increase, and this change will not
make the report θh better for any lower utility type. Similarly, allocating more than
the first best to the low utility type is suboptimal because, if the allocations is greater,
then the seller can decrease it marginally, and compensate by an increase in price, and
this compensation would leave the lowest type indifferent, but for all the other types
it would be insufficient, therefore leaving any constraints relaxed.
Lemma 3.3 Assume that in the setting presented W hold, and the results of the previ-
ous lemmas. Then, for every period, for each history, at most one of the compatibility
conditions in W for an agent α will bind.
Proof Write again the ICCs:
θhqh − q2h/2 − ph + uh ≥ θhql − q2l /2 − pl + ul
θlql − q2l /2 − pl + ul ≥ θlqh − q2h/2 − ph + uh .
Assume that both conditions above hold with equality. Then
θh(qh − ql) = q2h/2 + ph − uh − q2l /2 − pl + ul
θl(qh − ql) = q2h/2 + ph − uh − q2l /2 − pl + ul ,
so θh(qh − ql) = θl(qh − ql). Because qh ≥ θh > θl ≥ ql , we have a contradiction.

unionsq
From the previous lemma, we can also see that the high and low utility type allo-
cations must be different, by the conditions in W . If more than one compatibility
conditions hold, then it says that the difference in utilities minus the difference in
prices for two alternatives has to be 0, and for more than one utility type. This is not
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possible because utility differences for the same allocations are strictly monotone in θ .
A more general formulation of utility that would preserve the result has Uθ (θ, q) > 0,
and Uθ,q(θ, q) > 0 (known as the Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing condition).
Lemma 3.4 Consider any period with allocations, and assume the compatibility con-
dition in W for the buyer with θh-type utility does not bind. Then ql ≥ θl . Similarly,
if the θl -type condition does not bind, then qh ≤ θh.
Proof Say thatql < θl . Then∃
 > 0 s.t.ql+
 < θl . Consider themenu transformation
ql → ql + 
, pl → pl + (θl − ql)
 − 
2/2. Then, the new incentive compatibility
conditions will be:
θhqh − q2h/2 − ph + uh ≥ θh(ql + 
) − (ql + 




) − (ql + 
)2/2 − pl + (θl − ql)
 − 
2/2 + ul ≥ θlqh − q2h/2 − ph + uh .
⇔
θhqh − q2h/2 − ph + uh ≥ θhql − q2l /2 − pl + ul + (θh − θl)

θlql − q2l /2 − pl + ul ≥ θlqh − q2h/2 − ph + uh .
As long as 
 is small enough, the first incentive compatibility condition will hold
for the new menu. Moreover, the expected revenue of the seller is strictly increased
without affecting the buyer’s utility. For the second part of the statement, consider
now qh → qh − 
, ph → ph + (qh − θh)
 − 
2/2. After reworking, the new incentive
compatibility conditions will be:
{
θhqh − q2h/2 − ph + uh ≥ θhql − q2l /2 − pl + ul
θlql − q2l /2 − pl + ul ≥ θlqh − q2h/2 − ph + uh + (θh − θl)
.
If the θl compatibility condition will not bind, then for a small enough 
 the above
conditions will hold. As before, the seller’s expected revenue is increased, but the
buyer’s payoffs are left the same. 
unionsq
Decreasing the high utility allocations marginally towards the first best and then
compensating the pricewill leave the highutility type indifferent, but itwill improve the
high report option for the other type. However, if the old compatibility constraint was
slack, a marginal increase in the high type allocation will not violate the it. Similarly,
one can argue that increasing the low type allocation towards the first best and then
compensating the low utility type with a higher price will also be an improvement, but
only if the high type’s compatibility constraint is slack.
3.2 Solving the maximization problem
From now on assume W hold and that, in every period with allocations, the θl -type
incentive compatibility condition does not bind, while for the case with σ0 = αh the
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θh-type compatibility condition will also not have to bind, i.e., it is slack. With the
previous lemmas, the assumption gives us that, in every period after the 0th, qh = θh ,
and that after σ0 = αh we must have in every subsequent period ql = θl . Moreover,
at period 0, we assume that only the rationality constraint for the αl -type and the
compatibility constraint for the αh-type bind. The proof requires that we verify the
assumptions after we find the solution.
With the assumptions above, the allocations after reporting αh are fixed. The seller
needs to optimize the low demand type allocations if the buyer reported αl in period 0.
Since we have assumed that only the αl -type compatibility condition binds in period
0, we can maximize the seller’s value, keeping track of the fact that the information
rent earned by an αh buyer pretending to have the αl type must be subtracted with the
appropriate weight.
Lemma 3.5 Let v be the αl -type buyer value at the beginning of any period t ≥ 1, vh
and vl the buyer continuation value after a θ th and θ
t
l report respectively, and
P(v), P(vh) and P(vl)9 the corresponding seller values. The simplified seller’s max-
imization problem can be recursively stated as:
P(v) = max{ph ,pl ,vh ,vl ,ql }(1 − ϕ)[αl ph + (1 − αl)pl ] + α
′
lδP(vh) + (1 − α′l)δP(vl)
+ ϕ[−αh(θ2h /2 − ph) − (1 − αh)(θlql − q2l /2 − pl)] + C
(4)
s.t. (i) θ2h /2 − ph + δvh = θhql − q2l /2 − pl + δvl ,
(ii) v = αl(θ2h /2 − ph) + (1 − αl)(θlql − q2l /2 − pl) + α′lδvh + (1 − α′l)δvl ,
(iii) ql ≥ 0.
Proof Since the behavior of the αh type is already determined, the transfers and
allocations on the αh branch are of no concern, except for the fact that the seller pays
information rent to theαh type based on themenuoffered on theαl branch. Specifically,
with probability ϕ, the seller loses αh(θ2h /2 − ph) + (1 − αh)(θlql − q2l /2 − pl) in
expectation to the αh type as information rent. With probability 1 − ϕ, he gains the
expected payment of the αl type, αl ph + (1 − αl)pl .10 C minus the period specific
information rent is the seller’s gain from the αh type. Hence, the objective function is
the expected sum in (4).
By assumptions and W , the buyer reports θ truthfully if the constraint (i) holds.
Before having the period-specific private information, he current value of the buyer is
the expected gain from the trade, αl(θ2h /2− ph)+ (1−αl)(θlql −q2l /2− pl), plus the
discounted future expected value, α′lδvh + (1 − α′l)δvl , so (ii) holds. The allocations
can only be positive, so (iii) holds. 
unionsq
The optimal mechanism chooses ph, pl , vl , ql to maximize seller value (including
the continuation value). The discounted expected continuation value isα′lδP(vh)+(1−
α′l)δP(vl) (Fig. 3). Since we assumed that the αl -type rationality constraint in period
9 Time indices are dropped for simplicity. Future type probabilities are denoted by a prime symbol.












Fig. 3 Node sets determining buyer values in the recursive formulation, for the first period with allocations
0 holds with equality, we must have that v = 0 in the first period. Because there is an
indeterminacy in the price allocation,we can alsofixvh = vl = 0 tofind explicit prices,
but after we have determined the quantity allocations from the maximization problem.
Proposition 3.1 Assuming that condition (i i i) in Lemma 3.5 does not bind, the allo-
cation of a low buyer type after reporting θl in the maximization problem (4) is always
given by
ql = θl − (θh − θl) ϕ
1 − ϕ ·
αh − αl
1 − αl ,






− (θh − θl)(1 − αl)ql ,
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(i i i) holds with equality when θl (1−αl )
θh(αh−αl )+θl (1−αh) ≤ ϕ ≤ 1, and in this case ql =
0, ph = θ
2
h
2 and pl = 0 in that period.
Proof First assume that (i i i) doesn’t bind. Solve (i) and (i i) for ph and pl :









− v + vlδ + ql(αl(θh − θl) + θl).
Replace these expressions into the maximization problem, and get the first order con-
ditions. The first order condition determining ql will be:
(1 − αl)(−1 + ϕ)ql
−1 + ϕ +
θl(1 + αhϕ − ϕ − αl) − (αh − αl)θhϕ
−1 + ϕ = 0.
This solves for the ql expression. Observe that the allocation is determined for every
period after period 0. Because we ignored the non-negativity constraint (i i i), it is
necessary to see if ql is positive. It turns out that a necessary and sufficient condition
for that is:
ϕ ≤ θl(1 − αl)
θh(αh − αl) + θl(1 − αh) .
When this condition doesn’t hold, then ql = 0. To find the prices, it is necessary to fix
the indeterminacy by making some assumptions, because the seller can commit on the
contract offered, so changing the prices at period t by 
 and compensating at period
t+k by δ−k
 leaves the buyer with equivalent choices. Moreover, there is a one-to-one
trade-off for the buyer and the truthful seller between vh or vl and ph, pl . This suggests
that neither the absolute, nor the relative values of the continuation utilities vh, vl are
fixed, and the easiest way to deal with them is to assume vh = vl = 0. Of course, we
have to check that the compatibility constraints of the buyer that reports non-truthfully
will also hold, but this assumptionmakes all the four compatibility constraints for each
node hold, because of (i). Using the assumptions, we get the prices ph, pl in every
period. 
unionsq
The next result gives the allocations and prices offered if the buyer reports αh in
period 0.
Proposition 3.2 Assuming that condition (i i i) in Lemma 3.5 does not bind, the allo-





− θhθl + αhθhθl + θ2l − αhθ2l
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as well as a transfer of (αh−αl )(θh−θl )ql1−δ from the seller to cover the information rent
for the αh type buyer. When (iii) in Lemma 3.5 holds with equality in a period, there





, q ′l = θl − (θh − θl)
αh








Proof Solve the following equations, representing the binding θh-type incentive com-






















and this gives the results. We have assumed that the θh-type compatibility condition
must not bind, so that we can get ql = θl , yet we have obtained the above solutionmak-
ing the exact opposite assumption. But that is fine, since the compatibility condition





− θhθl + αhθhθl + θ2l − αhθ2l − (1 − αh)κ




− αhθ2l + αhκ.
It is straightforward to check that, because the high and low demand compatibility
conditions cannot both bind at the same time, a κ small enough always exists that
will leave every condition satisfied with strict inequality. This allows us to deduce that
ql = θl was a good assumption.
When the non-negativity constraint (iii) binds, there is no more occasion for the αh
type to earn information rents frommisrepresenting his type, because ql = 0 and theαl
type pays for all the value, whichever θ he reports. At this point, the seller should find
it optimal to start distorting the θl allocation of the αh buyer type. Formally, because
the compatibility condition for the θh type binds, Lemma 3.4 does not imply q ′l ≥ θl
anymore. One can solve the problem as if only the αh type exists in the standard way,
and check the compatibility conditions. It is easy to verify that the seller will extract
the entire value, and with 0 transfers at time 0, and the allocations from Proposition
3.1, all the incentive compatibility constraints are satisfied. 
unionsq
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Observe that the allocations and prices depend on the period only through the values
of the parameters {αth,l , θ th,l}, which justifies dropping the time indices. It is left to ver-
ify that all the assumptions on which individual rationality or compatibility conditions
in W will bind have been correct. Because of the symmetry of the allocations after
reporting α, it is obvious that all the compatibility conditions in S are also satisfied.
It was assumed that the θh-type condition holds with equality, for the buyer who has
reported his true α, which means that the θl -type compatibility condition will also
hold. If the buyer has not reported his α-type truthfully, then the compatibility condi-
tions starting from period 1 will be essentially unchanged, because of the symmetry
of the allocations, which means that vh = vl .
The last thing to check are the conditions in period 0. The IRCs are satisfied by
construction. If an αh-type buyer reports α1l , then the information rent he earns is given
by:
vh = (α1h − α1l )(θ1h − θ1l )ql + δα2hvh + δ(1 − α2h)vh,
which solves to
(α1h − α1l )(θ1h − θ1l )ql
1 − δ .
This is the transfer an αh-type buyer will get in period 0 in our solution, and the
expected utility starting from period 1 will be 0 by construction. Similarly, we can
find the expected utility of an αl -type buyer who reports αh :
(α1h − α1l )(θ1h − θ1l )(ql − θ1l )
1 − δ < 0.
Therefore, the lower type wouldn’t report αh , so he gets a continuation utility of 0.
Because we have found a solution satisfying the stronger collection of compatibility
conditions in S, it is the correct solution for the set of ICCs.
4 Discussion
Reintroducing the time indices for parameters that were dropped in the derivations, in
Proposition 3.1:
qtl = θ tl − (θ th − θ tl )
ϕ




It can be seen intuitively that the distortion of θl allocations at all points in time is
induced by the need to decrease rents for the high type buyer. A marginal increase q
in all allocations for a θ tl report of the low type buyer, at any period, would lead to a
proportional increase in rents ϕ(αth − αtl )(θ th − θ tl )q and the extra revenue for the
seller (1 − ϕ)(1 − αtl )(θ tl − qtl )q in that period, in the first order approximation. At
equilibrium, the two must be equal, and this gives the result.
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Varying the different parameters gives us results that coincide with those of simpler
problems. If ϕ = 0, then there is only one buyer type, who must sign a contract before
he knows his first θ . As expected, our solution becomes qtl = θ tl , qth = θ th , which is the
classical dynamic contract when the buyer has no private information. Substituting in
the prices determined in Proposition 3.1, it is readily seen that
αtl p
t
h + (1 − αtl )ptl = αtl
θ t2h
2
















With no private information, the buyer is allocated the first best, and pays an expected
price equal to the expected value of the allocation. The difference in the prices for the
two allocations reflects the information rent—the potential gain from lying about the
utility type.
As ϕ approaches 1, qtl becomes 0 when condition (i i i) in Lemma 3.5 binds. From
Proposition 3.2, the low buyer type is allocated qtl = 0 after low utility reports, and the
high buyer type receives reduced allocations q ′tl after low reports. The rent becomes
0 for the high buyer type because he cannot gain anymore from misrepresenting α. In
effect, the high type buyer is so dominant that the other type is distorted to the limit,
and the high type is treated as in the classic problem with only one type and no private
information.
When αth = αtl , in the limit the solution is the first best because the buyer has no
relevant private information that is not known at the moment of contracting. In this
case, the buyer types are not distinctive anymore, a situation equivalent to equivalent
to ϕ = 0.
The dynamics in this multi-period model are the result of the time variation of
the parameters {θ tl,h} and {αtl,h}, which are common knowledge. Since both the two
utility types and their distribution are allowed to change over time, allocations can
vary as well. However, the same expression derives the allocations in each period
after the first. Keeping in mind that the allocation distortions have the purpose to elicit
truthful reporting of private information, such private information is revealed through
the buyer type initially and then through the utility type every subsequent period.
The expression for the allocation distortions is common because the same type of
private information in revealed. In other words, there is no reason to distort n th period
allocations differently from (n+1) th period allocations—everything else being equal.
This reasoning holds only if the true buyer type is elicited at onset; otherwise each
period’s utility type report would lead to an updated prior for the buyer type as well.
It is instructive to contrast the dynamic evolution of allocations with that in
Battaglini (2005). The difference is in the informativeness of the private information
the agent has when the contract is signed. When the type follows a Markov process,
the initial type report has an exponentially decreasing correlation to the future type;
hence, the distortions decrease over time and the contract converges to the contract that
would be offered to a buyer with no private information (i.e., no distortions, and rents
are extracted ex ante.) In the current setting, the initial buyer type report is relevant for
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all subsequent type reports, so the distortions are consistent over time. One can see
the current setting as repeating a one period game infinitely many times, with utilities
and payments discounted. Since the only connection between periods comes from the
buyer type, which is reported in the truthful mechanism, the optimal allocations in all
future periods—so also the distortions from the first best—have to be similarly derived.
When types are given by a Markov process, the slow reduction in future allocation
distortions takes into account the progressively weaker impact of the initial private
information, which is the result of the geometrically decreasing correlation between
types over time. The form of the allocation distortions at all time periods is induced
by the trade-off between information rent and profit, so it is related to the impact of
the private information that the buyer or agent has at the moment when the contract is
signed.11
In future work, a straightforward but involved extension is solving for an arbitrary
finite number of buyer types. The equivalents of Lemmas 3.1—3.4 can be stated
for every pair of adjacent types, and then Lemma 3.5 must be reformulated for a
marginally distorted type—equivalent in our case to the αl type. To simplify and
reduce compatibility constraints further, a new condition on the distribution of types
is required to make sure that only incentive constraints between adjacent types are
relevant. This condition would become, in the limit of continuous types, proportional
to the inverse hazard rate. A conjecture is that for {αi }Ii=1 there are two indices 1 ≤ x <
y ≤ I s.t. for the α j buyer type with x ≤ j ≤ y, the low utility allocation is reduced,
but not entirely eliminated, and the reduction is now proportional to the probability
fraction of all the types i > j over the probability of type α j , so
∑I
j+1 λαi /λα j . For
αi , i < x, the low utility allocation is 0, while for αi , i > y, the low utility allocation
is efficient. This also hints at the solution in the continuous limit, where αx , αy would
have to be the bounds of a subinterval of types where low utility allocations are
distorted. Lower types would then receive 0 at low utility, and higher types receive the
first best. The continuous limit of the ratio of probabilities is then the inverse hazard
rate, divided by a scale factor.12
5 Conclusion
This paper analyses finite and infinite time contracts between a principal and an agent,
specifically focusing on set-ups in which the agent types and their utility types are
discrete, and when the agent has private information on the probability of his future
utility types. In general, the number of compatibility conditions that need to be consid-
ered is very large, but the solution can be searched in a wider space bounded by fewer
or weaker constraints, and confirmed with a stronger set of constraints. The paper pro-
poses a way to construct these weaker and stronger constraints. First look for direct
truthful mechanisms that incentivize a buyer who has reported his type truthfully to
11 If the buyer has no relevant private information about a future period at the moment of signing the
contract, the principal can always ask for the expected information rent as a fee.
12 A scale factor must appear since, if the range of the type distribution is “stretched”, the probability
density and hazard rate are reduced. However, the distortion should stay the same, since the buyer type
doesn’t directly influence utility.
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also report his utility type truthfully, after any history of reports. Then, verify that the
mechanism implies that all types will respond truthfully, regardless of history.
The method can be applied when the agent has private information that is not
completely random nor fixed, but comes from a type dependent distribution which
is his private information. In an example with two discrete types each period, the
optimal contract for two types of buyers with two types of utilities has some of the
usual properties found in the static problem, like no allocation distortions for the high
type. There are consistent distortions for the low type buyerwhen he reports low utility,
and the distortions decrease social welfare. The permanence of distortions reflects the
persistent value of the initial private information. The results provide some insight
into the pricing strategies of monopolistic suppliers of firms, franchises, or sellers that
have repeated interactions with their customers.
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